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Abstract
We propose a diffusion process to describe the global dynamic evolution of credit
operations at a national level given observed operations at a subnational level
in a sovereign country. Empirical analysis with a unique dataset from Brazilian
federate constituents supports the conclusions. Despite the heterogeneity ob-
served in credit operations at a subnational level, the aggregated dynamics at a
national level were accurately described with the proposed model. Results may
guide management of public finances, particularly debt manager authorities in
charge of reaching surplus targets.
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1. Introduction
Recent empirical literature supports a negative impact of public debt on
economic growth in both developed and emerging markets [1, 2, 3, 4]. Indeed,
poorly managed public debt has been an important factor in inducing and prop-
agating recent economic crises [5, 6].
While the linkage between public debt and economic growth for national
economies has long been studied, the investigation considering the public debt
at a subnational level has been largely neglected in the literature [7]. Matz and
Mitze (2015) [7] showed a link between regional public debt and economic growth
for German federal states. Further, Jenkner and Lu (2014) [8] and Buiatti,
Carmeci, and Mauro (2014) [9] provided empirical evidence that regional fiscal
imbalance influences public debt at a national level.
In this work, we consider a division of a sovereign state in administrative
units where each one can potentially contract credit operations with the approval
of the central government. The study of aggregated regional debt dynamics is
important as it impacts the public debt at the national level. We discuss the
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aggregated subnational debt related to credit operations pleaded by regional
governments and we propose a diffusion process [10] to model the number and
monetary volume of such operations. We describe mechanisms in financing that
motivate the modeling of the response variables to be a sigmoid curve annually.
A case study with federated entities in Brazil confirms this sigmoid pattern
and showcases the adequacy of the proposed diffusion processes. The applica-
bility of the proposed methods in other sovereign countries is also considered.
Results may be applied in distinct countries where credit pleas at the subna-
tional level are legitimate via consent of a central public finance management,
as is the case for the United Kingdom and Japan, for instance.
2. Methodology
Federated entities or administrative divisions of a sovereign state may per-
form credit operations for local financing purposes. Let N(t) be the aggregated
number of credit operations pleaded by federated entities in a given year, where
t ≥ 0 represents the continuous time since the first fiscal day of the year. We
propose to model the evolution of N(t) as a learning curve following a diffusion
process with a sigmoid trajectory.
The velocity with which entities of the public sector have credit operations
plaintiffs during the year is assumed to be intrinsically related to a learning
process where the number of credit pleas may be low at the beginning of the
year further accelerating with time until it reaches a climax point. By the end
of the year, the evolution of the number of credit operations may decelerate to
respect limits and fulfill conditions established by law. These constraints, in
addition to the credit volume limiters, lead us to propose the following diffusion
process:
N˙(t) = g(t){mn − [N(t)]n}/n, (1)
wherein the point superscript to N(t) represents the time derivative of this
variable; g(t) is the coefficient of diffusion; m represents the potential maximum
number of pleas, i.e., the saturation level or the carrying capacity [10]; and n is
a parameter which characterizes the distance between m and N(t).
With respect to the diffusion coefficient, we assume that the number of
operations pleaded is linearly related to the understanding of the process by
the parties involved, so that g(t) = wN(t), in which w is a learning speed
parameter. Hence, we solve the differential Eq. 1, as shown in Appendix A, to
find the logistic function:
N(t) = m{1 + (m− 1) exp[−wm(t− 1)]}−1. (2)
Considering that the course of the events concerning credit operations can
last months, and the object, value, financial conditions and other characteristics
of the pleas may change significantly, it may become more interesting to the
borrower to file a new plea. This situation characterizes a variable mortality
rate phenomenon, which was studied initially by Gompertz [11]. Thus, we
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extend the logistic model from Eq. 1 to incorporate the Gompertz function, as
presented in Appendix B, which leads to:
N(t) = m exp[−b exp(−ct)], (3)
where b = −(lnm)exp(w) and c = w. It is convenient to let the function
have more degrees of freedom, using the parameters m, b and c independently,
so that more adherence to the data can be achieved. The resulting model
is better suited to fit sigmoid curves with different levels of acceleration and
relaxation. Moreover, it presents a good compromise between descriptive power
and parsimony while having only three parameters for calibration.
3. Case Study: Credit Operations in Brazil
Federated units in Brazil are forbidden to issue bonds [12], but they can
take loans to fund projects of their interest. In order to accomplish credit
operations with financial institutions, federated entities must respect limits and
fulfill a series of conditions determined by law. The Brazilian National Treasury
Secretariat (STN) is in charge of checking these limits and conditions for the
credit pleas. Contracting credit operations by federal entities in Brazil is a
continuous flow process and the pleas can be sent at any time for STN’s approval.
In this context, two main general mechanisms make the time path of the
Treasury’s analysis response to be a sigmoid curve annually. The first is the
need to learn the new procedures to plead credit operations and to be informed
about the updated budgetary information that may change every year. The
second mechanism is related to several credit volume limiters, such as the fiscal
surplus target, and the amount of money in the market available for loans. The
first mechanism shapes the process as a learning curve, in which the number of
credit pleas may be low at the beginning of the year, while the second mechanism
imposes limits and therefore defines the level of saturation of the process.
Given Eq. 2, we defineN(t) to be the aggregated number of credit operations
of Brazilian states and municipalities. The parameter m is related to credit
constraints scattered in legal rules such as: (i) constitutional limitations for
the credit operations of the public sector1; (ii) limits and conditions for the
credit operations of the governments 2; (iii) rules of contingency for credit to
the public sector 3; (iv) fiscal space remaining from the surplus target; and (v)
discretionary limit of external operations 4.
The information about the credit operations of the federate entities was col-
lected from the Brazilian Treasury Secretariat database [16]. These data provide
specific information about the date and the value of each loan thus allowing the
1Defined in the Article 52 of the Brazilian Federal Constitution of 1988 [13].
2Resolution of the Senate n. 43 of 2001 [14].
3Defined in the Resolution of the National Monetary Council n. 2.827 of 2001 [14].
4Defined by the External Financing Commission according to the Article 7 of the Decree
n. 3.502 of the year 2000 [15].
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empirical verification of the trajectory of both the number of requirements and
the claimed financial volume. The credit data is given at state and municipality
granularities. Here, we consider the public debt of a state as the total debt of
its corresponding federated unit plus the debt of its municipalities.
Fig. 1 demonstrates that most of the operations are performed by a few
states. A Pareto relationship is observed where 80% of the number of credit
operations came from approximately 20% of the Brazilian states between 2002
and 2015. An asymmetric relationship also follows in monetary terms with the
same share of states being responsible for 40% of the total pecuniary volume
in the period analyzed. The values of the credit operations also present hetero-
geneity. Fig. 2 shows the complementary cumulative distribution of the value
of a credit operation performed by a state. The distribution of values is hugely
asymmetric which demonstrates the disparity among values of credit operations
in the states of Brazil.
Figure 1: Approximately 20% of the Brazilian states were responsible for more than 80%
of the total number of credit operations between 2002 and 2015. The same share of states
accounted for more than 40% of the monetary volume in the same period.
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Figure 2: Demonstration of heterogeneity in the value of credit operations. This figure shows
the complementary of the cumulative distribution function of the value of credit operations
in log-log scale.
4. Results and Discussion
The heterogeneity observed at the state level imposes challenges in the mod-
eling of the trajectory of the number and volume of credit operations. Despite
this complexity, we show that the observation of a sigmoid pattern at the ag-
gregated national level results in trajectories fit with high accuracy with the
proposed models.
We fit both the logistic (Eq. 2) and Gompertz (Eq. 3) models to the yearly
number of credit operations. The former model performed better for all years
and its results are shown in Fig. 3. The figure shows the curves for the yearly
number of credit operations that were assented by the government and the total
number of credit pleas (operations rejected included). The adherences of the
logistic and Gompertz models to the data, measured by the average of the R2
of the fitted curves, were above 96% and 98%, respectively. Model calibration
was performed using a nonlinear least squares fitting procedure implemented in
the cftool of the software Matlab r.
Notice that, in general, the yearly number of credit pleas increases slowly
at the beginning of each year then it accelerates nearly reaching the yearly
capacity. It then starts to slow down thus presenting a behavior well described
by a sigmoid function. In some years, the curves do not reach a flat region of
saturation (e.g. 2015 and 2005), indicating that the number of pleaded credit
5
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Figure 3: Demonstration that the amount of public credit pleas per year follows a sigmoid
diffusion process. This figure shows the total number of Brazilian credit pleas by year along
with the analytic solution provided by the derived Gompertz model.
operations might not have reached the government’s budgetary expectations.
Fig. 4 shows the derivatives of the number of credit operations (N˙(t)) in
time, which were fit via central finite differences. Again, we clearly observe
that each year is characterized by a period of acceleration followed by a peak
that precedes an ending period of relaxation. The peak of acceleration in the
number of credit operations consistently differs by year. Bearing in mind the
small sample of these responses, however, we observe that years with a peak
at the beginning of the period tend to follow years with a peak at the end of
the period and vice-versa. On the other hand, there is no clear tendency when
peaks occur in the middle of the year. These empirical observations indicate
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Figure 4: Derivative of the number of credit operations (N˙(t)). Clear peaks at the center and
periods of acceleration and relaxation in the tails. Empirical derivatives estimated via central
finite differences.
that the aggregated number of credit operations at a subnational level present
seasonal patterns which can be explained by political-economic cycles [17, 18],
for instance, related to election periods.
From 2002 to 2015, the variability of credit operations pleas in monetary
terms by year is considerable, especially due to outlier loans of very high value,
contrasting with the wide majority of operations of small value pleaded by
small states. This dispersion prevents the usage of the model of the number of
operations to describe the dynamics in monetary terms by simply multiplying
the number of credit operations by the yearly mean value of the pleas. However,
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Figure 5: Demonstration that the Gompertz model explains to some extent the public credit
pleas also in monetary terms. Figure shows the total credit pleaded per year along with the
analytical solution provided by the derived Gompertz model.
we observe that the aggregated volume of credit operations in monetary terms
also follows a sigmoid curve to some extent. This observation enables the usage
of the proposed models by simply replacing the number of credit pleas N(t)
with its corresponding value in monetary terms.
Fig. 5 shows the results of the fitting further demonstrating that the sigmoid
modeling can also be applied to the pecuniary aspect of the credit operations,
though with smaller quality, since the model does not capture the “jumps” due
to the presence of outliers in the pleaded values.
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5. Conclusions
We proposed a diffusion process to describe the dynamic evolution of the
number and volume of credit operations aggregated from a subnational level.
We uncovered a sigmoid pattern in the dynamics of credit operations further
validated with empirical data from Brazilian federate constituents. Despite the
heterogeneity observed at the subnational level, the aggregated dynamics at the
national level were accurately described with the proposed diffusion processes.
Moreover, even with the particular behavior presented in each year with respect
to acceleration, peak and capacity, all the curves were meaningfully adherent
to sigmoid trajectories in terms of the number and monetary volume of credit
operations. These results enable macroeconomic policy-making without a cum-
bersome analysis at a subnational level.
With the calibration of the proposed diffusion model, it is possible to obtain
insights into the evolution of public credit operations in a given year, which al-
lows improvements of economic nature, like the commitment to surplus targets.
Possible extensions of this analysis may take into account market expectations
and goals set by the government. Key variables to take into consideration in a
Gompertz parameter prediction exercise may include: GDP, credit risk ratings
and dummy variables for elections and anti-cyclical government interventions.
The proposed model might be useful to explain credit operations of other
countries. The sigmoid pattern is likely to be observed in other sovereign states
in which local government rely upon credit operations, like the United Kingdom
[19] and Japan [20] [21], where at least the limitation on loan amounts and
budgetary principle of annuity are immediate similarities that apply. Further
research along with the availability of consolidated data on other countries would
allow for the applicability and extension of proposed models.
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Appendix A. Solution of the logistic diffusion process
Recall Eq. 1, the differential equation of generalized growth, and consider it
with t ∈ R+ and n ∈ N∗:
N˙(t) =
dN(t)
dt
= g(t){mn − [N(t)]n}/n (A.1)
It is possible, using a notation abuse, to rewrite it as:
ndN(t)
N(t){mn − [N(t)]n}
= wdt (A.2)
Making use of partial fractions, we have:
nm−n
{
1
N(t)
+
[N(t)]n−1
mn − [N(t)]n
}
dN(t) = wdt (A.3)
By the chain rule, d[N(t)]n = n[N(t)]n−1dN(t) and performing the integra-
tion, it follows:
n ln |N(t)| − ln |[N(t)]n −mn| = wmn(t− t0) (A.4)
Once m ≥ N(t) ≥ 0, we can eliminate the modulus notation, and doing the
exponentiation we have:
[N(t)]n
mn − [N(t)]n
=
1
mn − 1
exp[wmn(t− t0)] (A.5)
11
in which t0 is the initial moment, that for methodological definition is the first
of the year, i.e, t0 = 1. Finally, isolating the function of interest we have:
N(t) = m{1 + (mn − 1) exp[−wmn(t− 1)]}
−1
n (A.6)
Assuming n = 1, which makes the growth expressed in the differential Equa-
tion 1 to be proportional to an unidimensional distance, one arrives at the for-
mula of Equation 2.
Appendix B. Derivation of Gompertz equation
Writing powers via logarithms and making n → 0, which corresponds to a
growth proportional to a logarithmic distance [11] in the differential Equation
1 , we have:
lim
n→0
N˙(t) = wN(t) lim
n→0
exp(n lnm)− exp[n lnN(t)]
n
(B.1)
Resorting to power series of the Napier’s exponential function, it follows:
N˙(t) = wN(t) lim
n→0
1
n
{
∞∑
i=0
(n lnm)i
i!
−
∞∑
i=0
[n lnN(t)]i
i!
}
(B.2)
Sorting out the two first elements of each summation, we have:
N˙(t) = wN(t)
{
ln
[
m
N(t)
]
+ lim
n→0
∞∑
i=2
ni−1
{
(lnm)i/i!− [lnN(t)]i/i!
}}
(B.3)
The limit of the remaining summation tends to zero, so that we have, as
already stated, a logarithmic distance:
N˙(t) = wN(t) ln
[
m
N(t)
]
. (B.4)
Rewriting the Equation B.4, again with notation abuse, follows:
d{ln[N(t)/m]}
ln[N(t)/m]
= −wdt. (B.5)
Integrating the Equation B.5 we have:
ln | ln[N(t)/m]| − ln | lnm| = −w(t− 1). (B.6)
Performing two exponentiations, we arrive at the Gompertz Equation:∣∣∣∣ ln[N(t)/m]lnm
∣∣∣∣ = exp[−w(t− 1)] (B.7)
N(t) = m exp{−(lnm)exp[−w(t− 1)]} (B.8)
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In the original Gompertz function, b = − (lnm) exp(w) and c = w, as can be
seen in Equation B.8 . But as previously mentioned, we allowed the parameters
to be independent in order to improve the adherence to the data. Adopting this
relaxation one arrives at the Equation 3.
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